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COMMENT
Navigating the Research Exemption's Safe Harbor:
Supreme Court to Clarify Scope-Implications for Stem
Cell Research in California
Gina C. Freschit
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2005, the Supreme Court agreed to review the Federal
Circuit's holding in Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA.1 The
decision, largely seen as a victory for research tool patentees in the
biotechnology sector, would if affirmed, promote cross-licensing
between universities and industry, as well as discourage
misappropriation of unlicensed patented tools. 2  Pharmaceutical
manufacturers argue that the decision is a limitation on drug
development activities that could potentially benefit human health,
and that restricting the use of tool patents in biomedical research
could mean years of delay in the availability of new, life-saving
drugs.3
The underpinnings of the Integra ruling involve federally
enacted, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 4  To encourage development and
expedite the introduction of pharmaceuticals into the marketplace,
t J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 2005; B.S./M.S., University of California
at San Diego, Biochemistry and Cell Biology, 1999. The author would like to thank Professor
Paul A. Stone, Esther Ko and Jennifer Chen for their critical assistance and commentary.
I. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7,
2005) (No. 03-1237).
2. Mark D. Uehling, Bio-IP 'Harbor' No Longer Safe for Research?, BIo-IT WORLD,
Aug. 2003, at 1, 23-26.
3. See Petitioner's Appellate Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (No. 03-1237).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). The statute has come to be known as the "FDA
research exemption" or "safe harbor," terms used interchangeably in this Comment. See infra
text accompanying note 40.
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Congress amended the patent laws in 1984 to insulate drug research
from charges of infringement so long as such research is "solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information" to the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").5 The
statute renders activities that would otherwise constitute patent
infringement noninfringing if they are undertaken for the purpose of
developing and submitting to the FDA information necessary to
obtain marketing approval for a new chemical entity, a medical
device, or a food additive. 6 Hence, the statute benefits competitors of
a patentee by freeing them of liability for development work
reasonably related to securing regulatory approval.
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase, "solely for uses
reasonably related to," the Integra court clarified that the FDA
research exemption applies only to those activities that directly
support information submitted for regulatory approval, such as
bioequivalency data for generic drug analogs.7 Specifically, the court
stated that the safe harbor did not "reach any exploratory research that
may rationally form only a predicate for future FDA clinical tests."8
The court held that Merck's unlicensed use of Integra's patented
research tool could not fall within the safe harbor provisions of §
271(e)(1) because Merck was not involved in clinical testing to
supply information to the FDA, but rather, had performed
exploratory, pre-clinical biomedical research aimed at identifying a
new drug candidate.9 Hence, according to the Federal Circuit, pre-
clinical testing (that which occurs before human testing) falls outside
the safe harbor.
Accordingly, the Integra decision affirms that "upstream"
research activities do not enjoy the benefits of the safe harbor, i.e.,
there is no defense to infringement for the use of patented materials
during the development of new drugs, or for general biomedical
experimentation, or for so-called "drug hunting."' 0 At the outset, this
seems reasonable when read in the context of the policy objective of
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
6. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 496 U.S. 661, 664, 672 (1990).
7. Paul Fehlner & Christina Yun-Ting Tsou, Not Such a Safe Harbor After All, INTELL.
PROP. LITIG. REP. Aug. 2003, at 2-3, available at
http://www.darbylaw.com/Files/tbl_s3 1 Publications/FileUploadl37/1802/INT/o20 Vol 1 0%201ss
6.pdf.
8. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237).
9. See id. at 865-68.
10. Fehlner & Tsou, supra note 7, at 2.
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§ 271(e)(1), which was to facilitate the immediate entry of safe,
effective generic drugs into the marketplace upon expiration of a
pioneer drug patent.1 1 Less than a year earlier, however, in Madey v.
Duke University,12 the Federal Circuit confirmed that the U.S. has a
very narrow common law experimental use exemption, which
excludes from immunity any use of unlicensed patented tools that is
"in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business." 13 Read
together, the Integra and Madey decisions could limit what many
academics have long seen as their right to use intellectual property
under statutory and common law research exemptions. In Madey,
when the court characterized the running of a university as a business
aimed at attracting students, Duke University's use of a patented laser
was seen as an effort directed toward garnering tuition-paying
students, and not as promoting learning for learning's sake.14 Various
commentators have expressed disagreement with these rulings as
encroaching on the progress of biomedical research at universities."
As the use of research tools in pre-clinical studies and basic
science is widespread among research universities and not-for profit
organizations, spectators are left wondering whether the Supreme
Court will affirm the Federal Circuit's ruling. Will biotechnology
and/or other research productivity companies be able to successfully
assert infringement of tool-type patents against university and not-for
profit researchers? 16 Where such research has potentially significant
implications for public health, many have voiced an urgent need for a
system that protects a patentee's rights while simultaneously
promoting basic research. 17 At the same time, would an expansion of
11. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry Association at 12, Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (No. 84-560), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
12. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
13. Id. at 1362.
14. See id. at 1362-63.
15. See, e.g., Tom Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the
Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 262 (2003).
16. Public universities, as arms of the states, may be granted sovereign immunity from
patent infringement liability under the Eleventh Amendment. In determining liability, courts
have looked to whether state actors fail to provide a remedy, "or only inadequate remedies, to
injured patent owners." Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Says. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 643 (1999) (finding unconstitutional a federal statute abrogating state immunity from
patent infringement).
17. Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 921 (2004) ( "A limited but meaningful experimental
2005]
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the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the "safe harbor" exaggerate
§ 271(e)(1) out of context and remove the benefits of the Patent Act
for biotechnological inventions?
The Supreme Court will consider whether the Federal Circuit
erred in holding that the research exemption does not encompass drug
development activities beyond those necessary to acquire information
for FDA approval of a patented pioneer drug already on the market.1
8
In particular, the Court will address whether the safe harbor protects
research studies back down the chain in the drug development
process, studies the pharmaceutical industry contends are distantly,
but still "reasonably related" to securing FDA approval.
This Comment explores the effect the decision will have on
research that is too remote from the FDA approval process to fall
within the statutory safe harbor, as well as research that is commercial
in nature, such that it does not qualify for the common law research
exemption articulated in Madey. Research associated with the
California Institute for Regenerative Medicine ("CIRM") is likely to
number among these kinds of research endeavors. Proposition 71, the
California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative,19 was approved
by voters on November 2, 2004.20 This legislation provides roughly
$3 billion in state bond money over ten years for human embryonic
stem cell research and facilities, specifically focused on embryonic
stem cell and progenitor cell research,2 1 which would be unlikely to
use exemption would further the patent system's constitutionally mandated goal of 'promoting
the progress of... the useful arts."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.)).
18. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237); see also Brief for
Petitioner at i, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (Feb. 15, 2005) (No.
03-1237) (framing the question presented as whether the FDA safe harbor protects the animal
and test-tube studies that typically accompany an application to the FDA to allow a new drug to
proceed to clinical trials with humans).
19. The California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM), official website, at
http://www.cirm.ca.gov (last visited Apr. 3, 2005); see also California Research and Cures
Coalition, official website, at http://www.curesforcalifomia.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
20. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 147-
49 § 5 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/english.pdf.
The [Independent Citizen's Oversight Committee] ICOC shall establish
standards that require that all grants and loan awards be subject to intellectual
property agreements that balance the opportunity of the State of California to
benefit from the patents, royalties, and licenses that result from basic research,
therapy development, and clinical trials with the need to assure that essential
medical research is not unreasonably hindered by the intellectual property
agreements.
Id. (referring to section 125290.3(h) to be added California's Health and Safety Code).
21. Id. at 147 § 3.
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receive timely or sufficient federal funding due to current federal
limitations on such research.
The Supreme Court's ruling will likely govern the use of
research tools in state-funded stem cell research activities at
universities and not-for profit organizations, as well as the use of such
tools (including stem cell lines) generated by this research. As a
result, the apparent commercial intent of stem cell research funded
under Proposition 71 will be a critical factor in applying the Supreme
Court's ruling. In addition, because stem cell research is in its early
stages (arguably years away from the point of regulatory submissions)
the Court's interpretation of "reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law,, 22 will most
certainly impact whether the unlicensed use of patented research tools
by groups associated with CIRM falls within the statutory safe harbor.
At the same time, because the state seeks to benefit from patents
ultimately granted under CIRM, giving such intellectual property the
broadest possible scope of protection is arguably in the state's best
interest.
This Comment explores the three most likely outcomes of the
pending Supreme Court decision and considers the implications in the
area of licensing research tools, and in particular, the regulation of
research using human embryonic stem cells in California with respect
to Proposition 71. Would affirmation of the Integra ruling, when read
in light of Madey, cause stem cell research to fall outside both the
statutory and common law research exemptions due to its early stage
of development and commercial purpose? Will this encumber
academic research scientists by requiring them to license patented
research tools that have until now appeared available to them under
the statutory and common law research exemptions? Or, would
affirmation of the Federal Circuit's ruling be in the state's best
interest due to its intention of profiting from patents and royalties
generated under CIRM?
In considering the various potential courses of action that the
Supreme Court may take, Part IV weighs competing policies
including: (1) the cost of drug research, (2) the incentive to develop
new chemical entities and research tools, (3) the need for access to
research tools, (4) the inability of academic institutions and nonprofit
organizations to afford costly licenses, and (5) the legislative history.
Part II presents (1) a background of policy concerns in patent doctrine
22. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
2005]
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and the emergence of the experimental use exemption, (2) the
development of the statutory FDA research exemption, (3) the facts of
the cases at issue, (4) a study of activities that have thus far been held
exempt from patent infringement, (5) a discussion of the definition of
"research tools," and (6) a description of stem cells as research tools.
Finally, Part IV argues that affirmation of the ruling is the best way to
preserve the incentives of the Patent Act, and that the legislature is the
best equipped branch of the government to specify the parameters of
the research exemption.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Competing Policy Concerns in Patent Doctrine and the
Experimental Use Exception
Article I of the United States Constitution states:
The Congress shall have the Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.
23
Patent protection laws were later enacted to embody these
Constitutional provisions. For example, the 1984 Patent Act
characterizes patent infringement in its preliminary paragraphs,
providing, in part:
[w]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.
24
Yet, two divergent policy concerns-a patentee's interest in
protecting his invention (and the commercial value thereof), and the
public's interest in benefiting from the technology25 --continue to
compete for lawmakers' recognition.
The rights inherent in a patent term of twenty years are set forth
in federally enacted 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1):
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
25. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1205 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2001).
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throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to
exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout
the United States, or importing into the United States, products
made by that process, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof.
26
It follows that a patentee has a statutory right to exclude others
from acts that infringe his patent. Yet this right may be limited by a
defense of "experimental use," a doctrine whose origins are often
linked to an opinion written by Circuit Justice Joseph Story in a case
before the Massachusetts Circuit Court in 1813.
In Whittemore v. Cutter,27 Justice Story reasoned in dicta
regarding the alleged infringement of a patent covering a machine
that produced playing cards: "[I]t could never have been the intention
of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a [patented]
machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects. 28 Subsequently, in Sawin v. Guild,29 Justice Story fashioned
an experimental use defense to exempt alleged patent infringers who
did not intend to profit by way of the infringing activity. Use of a
patented invention "for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment,
or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification"
describing the invention would not constitute patent infringement.3 °
Hence, the test seemed to turn on the commercial intent of the patent
user. Almost fifty years later, Judge Shipman wrote, "It has been
held, and no doubt is now well settled, that an experiment with a
patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical
taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of
the rights of the patentee,"' thereby further developing the common
law experimental use doctrine, so that it protected use of patented
26. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002).
27. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
28. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 685, 717-18 (2002) (quoting Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813 (No. 17,600)). But see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE
1018, 1018 (2003) (contending that "Justice Story's early-19th-century picture of a gentleman
scientist driven by idle curiosity predates the rise of the modem research university").
29. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
30. Id. at 555.
31. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
2005]
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inventions for amusement or verification of the workings of the
invention, but excluded activities motivated by financial gain.
32
Thus, the common law experimental use doctrine in patent law
makes an exception for infringers who use patented inventions for the
sole purpose of experimentation, or purely philosophical inquiry. The
"experimentation" described refers to a study of the patented
inventions--clearly not the use of a patented invention to investigate
an altogether different experiment, such as using patented microarray
technology to study cancer cells. Therefore, the issue that remains is
to define "philosophical inquiry" in today's society.33  In our
technology-driven economy, close ties between academic and
commercial research are commonplace, making it difficult to draw a
clear line between academic inquiry for the purposes of basic
research, and research conducted with some expectation of future
monetary gain. The same discrepancy may be found in the
interpretation of the terms "science" and "technology." Some have
opined that when the common law research exemption emerged
almost 200 years ago, "science" must have been considered separate
from "technology," as basic scientists had little to do with industry,
and basic and applied research were thought to be distinct fields.34
While courts continue to acknowledge the existence of the
common law experimental use doctrine, they frequently find a
commercial motive behind the accused infringing activity. In the
pharmaceutical industry, there is ongoing tension between the
simultaneous need to establish incentives for pioneer-drug companies
(typically large pharmaceutical companies) to invest in the research
and development of new drugs, and the need to enable generic
competitors to bring competitively priced analogs to the market.
Discoveries made in biomedical research often have spectacular
applications in the multi-billion dollar healthcare market. The
combination of high-stakes economic value and contemporaneous
32. Id. See also Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1018 (noting that only one case since 1861
generated a published opinion holding that use of a patented invention in a university laboratory
qualifies for the defense; see Ruth v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo.
1935)).
33. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874-75 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("By 'philosophical'
experiments Justice Story was referring to 'natural philosophy,' the term then used for what we
today call 'science."').
34. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431, 433 (2004).
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improvements in the quality of healthcare has required balancing
these two priorities.
This conflict came to a head in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical, Co. when the Federal Circuit found that defendant
generic drug manufacturer, Bolar, had infringed Roche's drug patent
when it used samples for bioequivalency testing of their generic
product submitted for FDA regulatory approval.36 The seeming
unfairness of the ruling sparked a heated Congressional debate: If the
Roche ruling would not allow generic competitors to begin
bioequivalency testing until after a patent expires-and
bioequivalency testing can take years to complete-would the effect
be an artificial extension of the length of the pioneer drug patent's
term? The patentee's original drug would remain the only drug on
the market while competitors completed testing. Indeed, if
performing the necessary tests to produce generic copies of patented
drugs constituted patent infringement, the Roche result appeared
unfair. It has since been re-emphasized that innovation in certain
scientific areas would be impossible, or, at least impractical, without
some kind of experimental use exemption.
37
B. The Statutory FDA Research Exemption-35 U.S. C. § 271(e)
After the Roche ruling, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),
also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984).38 Its response to
Roche was to "ensure that a patentee's rights did not defacto extend
past the expiration of the patent term because a generic competitor...
could not enter the market without regulatory approval.,
39
35. Peter J. Prominmer, The Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturer Agreements: Is the
Sherman Act Big Enough to Swallow These Pills?, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 215, 216
(2002).
36. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
CHISUM, supra note 25, at 1204.
37. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989) (offering suggestions on the proper scope of
an experimental use defense in light of the intent of the patent laws and the needs of the research
community).
38. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)) (effectively
overruling Roche); see also Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH.
L. REv. 1, 22-27 (2001) (describing the judicial and legislative developments leading to the
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
39. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237).
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There are three provisions of the 1984 Act, one of which is a
research exemption that defines a "safe harbor" against patent
infringement:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention.., solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ....
As stated above, this arm of the statute permits competitors to
conduct experiments in advance of patent expiration as long as the
research activities are reasonably related to securing FDA regulatory
approval. The purpose of enacting this provision was to encourage
generic competitors to enter the drug market immediately upon
expiration of the original drug's patent.41  Now, competitors are
allowed to conduct experiments in advance of patent expiration so
that extensive approval processes and time consuming experiments do
not "artificially" extend the pioneer drug's patent term, thereby
preventing generic manufacturers from entering the market as soon as
possible. Hence,
[e]xperimental use as a defense to infringement is likely to be
particularly important where it is difficult or impossible to evaluate
a product or design around a patent without reproducing the
product itself.... The experimental use doctrines accommodate
the general rules of patent law to the needs of iterative industries in• 42
which copying or open use of prototypes is a practical necessity.
Many, including Henry Waxman and Senator Orin Hatch,
believed that this provision would simultaneously promote the
development of lower cost, generic drugs while encouraging
40. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see also Mueller, supra note 38, at 25 n.126 (citing
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining
that submission of information to the FDA by generic drug manufacturers usually occurs in the
form of an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"), which requires that the generic drug
be the bioequivalent of a "listed drug")).
41. Brief of Amicus Curiae Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association at 3-4, Roche
Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm., Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (No. 84-560) (stating that the
granting of Roche's injunction "would effectively extend all drug patent monopolies by at least
two (2) years, thereby undermining the public policy favoring the availability of lower costing
generic drugs and causing economic injury to the public as well as to the companies engaged in
the manufacture and sale of generic drugs").
42. Brief of Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District of Columbia-Patent,
Trademark & Copyright Section In Support of Neither Party at 5-6, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237) (quoting Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1648 (2003)).
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innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.43 And, many contend that
both sides have thrived as a result.44 Since § 271(e)(1) was enacted in
1984, the generic share of the pharmaceutical market has risen from
less than twenty percent to nearly fifty percent.45 On June 17, 2003,
Bruce N. Kuhlik, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"),
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that, "[t]he Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984 is achieving its purpose of speeding market
entry of generic drugs."
46
Kuhlik and others also argue that patent laws provide a key
incentive for continued innovation in medicines.47 Better treatments
and new cures will emerge if patent incentives are maintained.
Indeed, the expense of developing an innovative therapeutic has
increased sharply to an estimated $800 million over the course of the
entire research and development process. 48  This is a conservative
estimate, according to another study, which pinpoints the cost at $1.7
billion when additional costs are considered. 49 Furthermore, there is
significant risk in investing in the development of a single
pharmaceutical. It takes ten to fifteen years on average for an
experimental drug to travel from the lab to U.S. patients. 50 Only five
43. See Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Patent
Incentives for Discovery of New Medicines Must Be Maintained, PhRMA Tells Lawmakers
(June 17, 2003), at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/l 7.06.2003.747.cfm.
44. Frederick Tong, Widening the Bottleneck of Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity, 24
WHITTIER L. REV. 775, 775 (2003) ("Both the generic and pioneer drug manufacturers have
thrived since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The generic drug industry now routinely
handles over forty percent of prescription medications, while the pioneer drug manufacturers
have consistently posted strong profits.").
45. Testimony of Gregory J. Glover, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, before the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division (Mar. 19, 2002), athttp://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/24.06.2002.432.cfm.
46. Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Patent
Incentives for Discovery of New Medicines Must Be Maintained, PhRMA Tells Lawmakers,
supra note 43.
47. See id.
48. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151-85 (2003); see also TUFTS CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, OUTLOOK 2002, at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/infoservices/outlookpdfs/outlook2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
49. James Gilbert et al., Rebuilding Big Pharma 's Business Model, IN Vivo, Nov. 2003,
at 4, available at
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/rebuildingbig__pharma.pdf.
50. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, New Medicines in
Development: The Drug Development and Approval Process, at
http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/resources//2000-09-18.74.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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in 5,000 compounds that enter preclinical testing make it to human
testing, and only one of these five tested in people is approved by the
FDA.51 Accordingly, many believe that the system needs financial
incentives and the protections afforded by the patent system;
otherwise, competitors could simply rob the fruits of millions of
dollars worth of investment.
While most would acknowledge the benefits of the Act, the
problem in applying the statute lies in defining the language "solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law." Although the intent of the Act was
directed toward the preparatory experimental work of generic
manufacturers, the wording of the provision is general enough to be
applied more broadly. 52 For example, was the language "patented
invention," as used in the statute, intended to embrace patented
research tools or only pioneer drugs? Further, and most relevant to
the case at issue, at what point are experimental activities too
attenuated to no longer be considered "reasonably related" to securing
FDA approval? The Federal Circuit stated that the district court was
correct in confining the § 271(e)(1) exemption, based on a test from
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., to activities that "would contribute
(relatively directly) to information the FDA considers in approving a
drug. '53 The interpretation of this phrase lies at the core of current
controversy; hence, the Supreme Court is likely to clarify its meaning.
C. Facts of the Cases at Issue
1. Merck v. Merck KGaA
Between 1994 and 1998, Merck KGaA ("Merck"), The Scripps
Research Institute ("TSRI") and Dr. David Cheresh allegedly
infringed patents to fibronectin peptides held by plaintiffs, Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd. ("Integra"), The Burnham Institute, and Telios
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.54 Integra is a manufacturer of medical devices,
51. Jeffrey P. Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, FDA CONSUMER
SPECIAL REP., Jan. 1995, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrugbegin.html.
52. Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising
from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
347, 367 (2004).
53. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237) (quoting Intermedics,
Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
54. Integra, 331 F.3d at 862 n. I (stating that as of December 1996, Integra acquired all of
Telios' property rights in the asserted patents).
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including tissue regeneration products, with headquarters in
Plainsboro, New Jersey and a research facility in La Jolla,
California."5 In 1998, Integra licensed a technology for making
synthetic peptides from The Burnham Institute, also in La Jolla,
California. 6 The license included the synthetic tripeptide arginine-
glycine-aspartic acid ("RGD"), which is useful for promoting
adhesion in cell culture and in vivo through attachment to receptors on
the surface of cells. 7  Before 1997, Dr. Cheresh, working
independently as a scientist at TSRI (a not-for profit institution), saw
that blocking various cell receptors would inhibit angiogenesis, or
blood vessel development. 58 Inhibiting angiogenesis has shown to be
an effective means of preventing tumor growth by limiting the
vascularization around tumors, thereby "starving" dividing cancer
cells. 59 Anti-angiogenic therapies may also be promising in the
treatment of diabetic retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis and psoriasis,
among other diseases.6° Merck, having taken note of the importance
of this discovery, hired TSRI and sponsored Dr. Cheresh to identify
potential drug candidates for clinical development in the form of
RGD peptides that would inhibit tumor vascularization. 6' Telios,
which had been unsuccessful in commercializing a product making
use of the patented tripeptide,62 learned of TRSI's application of its
patent and believed the angiogenesis research was part a commercial
endeavor.63 It then offered Merck a license, which Merck declined,
claiming its research was exempt from patent infringement under
§ 271(e)(1). 64
55. See Integra Lifesciences Corp., official website, at
http://www.integra-ls.com/corporate info/profile.asp (last visited Arp. 2, 2005).
56. See The Burnham Institute, official website, at http://www.bumham.org (last visited
Apr. 3, 2005).
57. Erkki Ruoslahti & Michael D. Pierschbacher, New Perspectives in Cell Adhesion:
RGD and Integrins, 238 SCIENCE 491 (1987).
58. Staffan Strdmblad & David A. Cheresh, Cell Adhesion and Angiogenesis, 6 TRENDS
IN CELL BIOLOGY 462,462-68 (1996).
59. Vicki Brower, Less Is More, 4 EMBO REP. 831, 832 (2003).
60. Peter Carmeliet & Rakesh K. Jain, Angiogenesis in Cancer and Other Diseases, 407
NATURE 249, 251 (2000).
61. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237).
62. Brief of Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District of Columbia-Patent,
Trademark & Copyright Section in Support of Neither Party at 2, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
63. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
64. Id.; see also Respondents' Brief on the Merits at 15, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
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Telios and the Burnham Institute brought suit in a district court
in southern California in 1996, and Integra joined the action as a
plaintiff when it acquired Telios's patent rights.65  Following the
jury's determination of infringement, the plaintiffs were awarded a
reasonable royalty of $15 million.66 Merck appealed to the Federal
Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's ruling, finding that
defendants' research activities fell outside the scope of the safe harbor
as they were not "solely for uses reasonably related" to provision of
information to the FDA under § 271(e)(1). 67  As stated earlier,
subsection (e)(1) of 35 U.S.C. § 271 permits generic competitors to
conduct experiments in advance of patent expiration as long as those
activities are "reasonably related" to securing regulatory approval.68
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit found
that Merck's work was not clinical testing conducted to supply
information to the FDA, but pre-clinical biomedical research aimed at
identifying the best drug candidate to subject to future FDA clinical
testing.69 The court reasoned that such "drug hunting" would require
extensive clinical testing to gain FDA approval, while creating a
generic copy would not.70 Thus, Merck's use of Integra's patented
tripeptide was not "reasonably related" to clinical testing for the sole
purpose of supplying information to the FDA, but rather exploratory
biomedical research aimed at identifying a new drug candidate. 71
2. Madey v. Duke University
In an altogether different matter, more than a year before the
Integra ruling, Plaintiff John M.J. Madey ("Madey") initiated a patent
infringement suit against Duke University.72  Madey, an
electromagnetic radiation research scholar, invented and patented the
free electron laser while a tenured professor at Stanford.73  Duke
recruited Madey to create a free electron laser laboratory for its
65. Integra, 331 F.3d at 862 n. 1.
66. Id. at 869. The damages award was subsequently vacated by the Federal Circuit due
to the uncertainty of whether any useful drug would be developed at the time the RDG peptide
was being used. The court suggested that this should have been factored into the damages
calculation. See id. at 869-72.
67. Id. at 866, 868.
68. See supra text accompanying note 6.
69. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
958 (2003).
73. Id.
RESEARCH EXEMPTION'S SAFE HARBOR
physics department. 4 Subsequently, Duke succeeded in removing
Madey from the position of lab director after a disagreement surfaced
between the two parties. 75 Despite this move, Duke continued to use
the laboratory equipment Madey had designed.76 After bringing suit,
Madey lost at the district court level, which placed Duke's actions
within the scope of the common law experimental use exception, and
partially dismissed his claim for failure to "sufficiently establish that
[Duke's] use of the patent had 'definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes."'' 77 The Federal Circuit reversed-
in-part, holding that the lower court erred in partially granting Duke's
motion to dismiss based on the common law experimental use
defense.78 The court held that this defense is available only if the use
of the patented invention is "solely for amusement, to satisfy the idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry., 79  In addition, the
court emphasized that the defense does not apply if the use is "in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business.,,8' The
court reasoned that the University is in the business of education and
attracting students, and that the lab's equipment advanced this
purpose. 81 The Federal Circuit disapproved of the district court
reasoning, which it said attached too much weight to the not-for profit
status of Duke, and effectively concealed the fact that Duke's
activities were in accordance with a reasonable interpretation of its
legitimate business objectives.82
D. Activities That Have Thus Far Been Held Exempt from
Patent Infringement
In 1995, after acquiring the now-invalid patent rights to "Taq" as
well as the PCR DNA amplification reaction that uses the "Taq"
enzyme, Hoffman-La Roche (Roche) attempted to bring suit against
more than forty U.S. universities and research institutes (including
Harvard, Stanford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Salk
Institute, The Scripps Research Institute, and the National Cancer
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1352-53.
76. Id. at 1352.
77. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (M.D. N.C. 2001) (quoting Roche
Products v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
78. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
79. Id. at 1362.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Institute) as well as more than 200 private scientists for allegedly
infringing these patents. 83 Although Roche was not successful in this
suit due to the subsequent invalidation of the patent, the mere
accusation brought an angry response.84 Following the filing of the
complaint in federal court in 1995, Nobel laureate Dr. Arthur
Komberg of Stanford University described Roche's attempt to restrict
the use of the PCR technology at research universities as "violat[ing]
practices and principles basic to the advancement of knowledge for
the public welfare.,
85
Roche's allegations may have been the result of a movement in
U.S. district courts toward expanding the scope of the research
exemption after the 1984 enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
According to Charles Raubicheck et al., in Integra v. Merck: A Mixed
Bag for Research Tool Patents, U.S. District Courts had adopted the
trend of interpreting the research exemption broadly.86 All activities
directed toward drug discovery seemed as though they would be
exempt, thereby reducing the value of research tool patents.87
For example, a district court in Massachusetts extended the
research exemption to pre-clinical drug discovery activities in Amgen,
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.88  Hoechst manufactured and
used large quantities of Amgen's genetically-engineered, patented
erythropoietin ("EPO") while it attempted to develop a competing
product. 89 The court held that Hoechst's export of Amgen's EPO to
Japan, purity testing, demonstration of consistency by manufacturing
three consecutive batches of EPO, functional characterization, viral
clearance tests in Europe, and plans for radio-labeling studies on the
patented invention, were all activities exempt from patent
infringement under § 271 (e)(1). 9°
83. Mueller, supra note 38, at 3 n.7 (citing Marcia Barinaga, Scientists Named in PCR
Suit, 268 SCIENCE 1273-74 (1995)).
84. Eliot Marshall, Battling Over Basics, 277 SCIENCE 25 (1997).
85. Mueller, supra note 38, at 3 (quoting Hoffman-La Roche Challenges Freedom of
Researchers; List of "Infringers" Includes Hundreds of Researchers and Dozens of
Government-Supported Laboratories, BUS. WIRE, May 24, 1995).
86. Charles Raubicheck et al., Integra v. Merck: A Mixed Bag for Research Tool Patents,
21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1099, 1100 (2003).
87. Id.
88. 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
89. Id. at 106.
90. Id. at 109-11.
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A New York district court found along the same lines in Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.91 There, Bristol-
Myers used various chemical intermediates claimed in a Rhone-
Poulenc patent directed to processes for preparing the anti-cancer
drug, Taxol. 92  Bristol-Myers employed the intermediate in
experiments for the development of a closely related competitor.93
The court held that these uses were exempt from infringement under §
271(e)(1) because they represented preliminary studies that could
ultimately facilitate or be useful in generating information for
submission to the FDA.94 Specifically, the court adopted the
argument that use of the patented intermediates was reasonably
related to an FDA application "even where each such use does not
directly result in an FDA application being filed, so long as the use
was made in order to determine whether or not an application for
approval would be sought."95 Further, the court agreed that even
though each use of the patented intermediates may not directly yield
information that could be submitted to the FDA, such use would be
noninfringing if related to a preliminary activity that could facilitate
or be useful in generating information that could be submitted to the
FDA.96 Hence, in applying a broad construction of the language
"reasonably related to," the court found all Bristol's activities exempt
from infringement, a ruling that runs directly counter to Integra.
Similarly, a district court in Delaware took an expansive view of
the research exemption in Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell
Corp.,97 wherein AmCell used Nexell's patented CD34 antibodies for
the development of a magnetic cell separating device (CliniMACS) it
planned to submit for FDA approval.98 While the court stated that
activities only exceed the safe harbor "when they have no objectively
reasonable application towards obtaining FDA approval," 99 it held
many of AmCell's activities exempt from infringement even though
91. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP),
2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
92. Id. at *l.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *7.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Del. 2002).
98. Id. at 198.
99. Id. at 205.
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they appeared to be in furtherance of marketing the product.100 The
Nexell court stated that the allegedly infringing activities were
conducted pursuant to soliciting clinicians to enter into FDA-
approved clinical trials. 1 1 Therefore, the research activities were
reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval, and covered by §
27 1(e)(1).10 2 The court observed in dicta that excluding preliminary
activities from the safe harbor would "chill parties from engaging in
the very pre-approval testing that Congress sought to encourage.
'' 03
These cases and others are referenced in a comprehensive list of
activities that have been found exempt from patent liability by various
courts since the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 1°4  More
recently, since the Integra ruling, a district court in Florida extended
the protections of § 271 (e)(1) to defendant Arriva Pharmaceuticals for
its use of a patented process covering the treatment of eye and ear
infections through the application of a therapeutic protein, Alpha 1-
Antitrypsin ("AAT"). 10 5 Arriva's main corporate mission at the time
of its creation was to develop a genetically engineered version of
Prolastin for use in pulmonary and topical applications. 10 6  The
company began to focus on the development and commercialization
of recombinant protease inhibitors for treatment of a wide range of
human diseases, including eye and ear infections.107 Plaintiff
Alphamed Pharmaceuticals alleged that Arriva infringed its patent by
collaborating with the University of Florida with respect to preclinical
research studies associated with AAT.1
08
Distinguishing the facts from those in Integra, the court found
that there were no allegations that the purportedly infringing activities
consisted of research into new compositions that would lead to new
100. See id. at 204. These activities included, inter alia, advertising CliniMACS in
medical journals, providing the CliniMACS device to FDA-approved clinical investigators for
free, and giving the CD34 reagent kits to the investigators on a cost-recovery basis.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Nexell Therapeutics, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
104. John R. Wetherell et al., Integra's Win May Give Cause for Re-Evaluation of Future
Exploratory Research Activities, Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, Aug. 6, 2003, at
http://www.pillsburywinthrop.com/files/tbls31 Publication/PDFUpload2O8/8875/BiotechLifeSc
iencesNews 1 .pdf.
105. Alphamed Pharms. Corp. v. Arriva Pharms., Inc., No. 03-20078-C1V, 2005 WL
357326 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2005).
106. Id. at * 1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *5.
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drugs or FDA approval for different drugs.' 09 Rather, the complaint
merely contained allegations "that Arriva has been conducting
clinical trials relating to AAT for use in ear infections, precisely the
kind of research that the safe harbor provision protects."' 10 Thus, the
court held that Alphamed failed to allege any activities on the part of
defendant that would constitute infringement of plaintiff's patents.
The Madey and Integra cases represent recent and compelling
examples of patent infringement suits in which a patentee was
successful in asserting his rights against a university and a
pharmaceutical company with ties to a not-for profit institution,
before the Federal Circuit."' The Integra ruling is the first Federal
Circuit decision to indicate a possible break from a trend of broadly
reading § 271(e)(1) at the district court level. 112 Accordingly, many
research productivity companies owning research tool patents are
looking to the Supreme Court to affirm the Federal Circuit's ruling.
To be sure, some commentators contend that "the Federal Circuit is
correct in acknowledging the immense value of research tools and the
worthiness of a system that helps produce them."' '13 The last time the
Supreme Court addressed § 271(e)(1) was in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc. 14 There, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the
Court focused on different language in the statute, namely, "a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."
'
"
15
109. Id. at *8.
110. Id.
111. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents. In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most cases involving patent issues.
The Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in patent cases, making the Federal Circuit the court
of last resort in most instances. Therefore, U.S. patent law is predominantly shaped by the
decisions of the Federal Circuit. See Tao Huang, Note, The Experimental Purpose Doctrine and
Biomedical Research, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 98 n.3 (2004) (citing 4
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.06 (2004)).
112. Raubicheck et al., supra note 86, at 1101; see also Huang, supra note 11, at 102,
105 (noting that "[w]hile the district courts were utilizing § 271(e)(1) to circumvent Roche, the
Federal Circuit sat quietly," and that in Integra, "the Federal Circuit cut back the district courts'
broad interpretations of § 271 (e)(l )").
113. Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE
L.J. 659, 691-93 (2004). Lee proposes a new model for patents on research tools in which a
robust experimental use exception would exist for a finite period of time immediately following
the granting of a patent in which noncommercial experimental use of the patented research tool
would be permitted. Upon expiration of this safe harbor, any nonlicensed use of the patented
material, even for experimentation with no commercial application, would constitute
infringement.
114. 496 U.S. 661 (1990); see infra text accompanying note 6.
115. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665-69.
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Recognizing a good deal of legislative imprecision and ambiguity in §
271(e)(1), the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's ruling in favor of
respondent Medtronic, holding that its use of Eli Lilly's patented
implantable defibrillator was not infringement because it was related
to obtaining FDA approval for a generic substitute intended to be sold
commercially only after the patent expired.1 16 Thus, the Medtronic
Court held that the scope of § 271(e)(1) encompasses not only the
testing and manufacture of generic drugs, but medical devices as well.
E. Defining "Research Tools"
A research tool is a product or method whose purpose is use in
the conduct of research.'1 17 Biological tool patents protect technology
used to conduct preliminary experiments as first steps in the pre-
clinical stages of drug discovery, most often for the validation of drug
targets, as well as for the diagnosis of disease. Examples include
reagents for molecular biology, such as enzymes, synthetic peptides" 18
and short oligonucleotides, non-therapeutic antibodies used for
screening assays, and full length genes or proteins which may be
actual drug targets.119 A host of tools are available for uncovering
gene function and activity, such as RNAi, a technique employed for
the functional analysis of genes, and specifically, the antagonism of
individual gene activity, 120 as well as microarrays of DNA or proteins
used for measuring changes in RNA or protein production.12 1 The
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") Working Group on Research
Tools defines "research tool" in its broadest sense as "embrac[ing] the
full range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory," including
"cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets,
clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory
116. See id. at 666-74.
117. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
118. Justice Newman, however, disagreed that the RGD-containing peptide is a "research
tool." See id.
119. See Sandy M. Thomas et. al., Shares in the Human Genome-The Future of
Patenting DNA, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1185, 1186 (2002) (asserting that "[any DNA
sequence that has a use in research can be classed as a research tool").
120. Michael T. McManus & Phillip A. Sharp, Gene Silencing in Mammals by Small
Interfering RNAs, 3 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 737 (2002).
121. See Robert F. Service, Microchip Arrays Put DNA on the Spot, 282 SCIENCE 396,
396-99 (1998).
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equipment and machines, databases and computer software.' ' 122  In
her article, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools,
Professor Janice M. Mueller composed a list of some of the most
noteworthy biotechnological research tools, all of which are currently
subject to proprietary restraints. 123 They include,
patented technology used to create "conditional mutants," [which
are] mice in whom a targeted gene is deleted when the cre gene
encounters two loxP DNA segments bracketing the targeted
gene[,] 12
4
[t]he Cohen-Boyer patents covering the basic method and plasmids
for gene cloning, assigned to the University of California and
Stanford University[,]
[t]he tumor-prone "oncomouse," [which] is useful as a model in
cancer research[,] 1
26
expressed sequence tags (ESTs) ... believed to be useful as probes
in searching for corresponding full-length genes[, and]127
[h]uman embryonic stem cells, from which any type of human
tissue can [potentially] be grown. 128
122. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm; see also Principles and Guidelines for
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical
Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n. I (Dec. 23,1999) (concluding
that "[research tools] embrace the full range of tools that scientists use in the laboratory,
including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors,
combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods,
laboratory equipment and machines").
123. Mueller, supra note 38, at 12.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 12-13.
126. Id. at 13; see also Andrea D. Brashear, Evolving Biotechnology Patent Laws in the
United States and Europe: Are They Inhibiting Disease Research?, 12 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 183, 206 (2001).
127. Mueller, supra note 38, at 13-14.
128. Id. at 14.
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Hence, research tools enable new biological understanding,
facilitate new drug discoveries and development, and make it possible
for researchers to work more quickly, more efficiently, and less
expensively.' 29 Their value will be discussed more fully in Part IV.A.
For the purposes herein, this Comment adopts Professor Mueller's
definitions of "research tools," which reflect the NIH's definitions in
their broadest sense.
F. Stem Cell Research and Research Tool Patents
Stem cells are unspecialized precursor cells with the ability to
self-renew and differentiate into specialized cells in response to
appropriate signals. 30 Serving as a sort of repair system for the body,
stem cells can theoretically divide without limit to replenish other
cells.' 31 They integrate perfectly into whatever site they may come to
occupy, adopting the character and behavior that normal cells would
show at that site. 132
Perhaps the most important potential application of human stem
cells is the generation of cells and tissues that could be used for cell-
based therapies. 133  Donated organs and tissues are often used to
replace ailing or destroyed tissue; however, the need for
transplantable tissues and organs far outweighs the available
129. Brief of Amici Curiae Invitrogen Corp. et al. at 10, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237) (noting that as a result of the invention of
DNA microarrays "what used to take a post-doc[toral student] in the laboratory approximately
six months with proper front-end research can now be done in 20 minutes") (quoting FED.
TRADE COMM'N., To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 19-20 (2003)).
130. Sheng Ding & Peter G. Schultz, A Role for Chemistry in Stem Cell Biology, 22
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 833 (2004) (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS:
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS (2001), at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scireport).
131. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 1 (2001), at http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scireport (last visited
May 4, 2005).
132. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL § 5.22 (Bruce Alberts et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001)
In the normal adult body, different classes of stem cells are responsible for the
renewal of different types of tissue. Some tissues, however, seem incapable of
repair by the genesis of new cells because no competent stem cells are present.
Recent discoveries have opened up new possibilities for manipulating stem-cell
behavior artificially so as to repair tissues that previously seemed unrepairable.
Id.
133. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELL BASICS: VI. WHAT ARE THE
POTENTIAL USES OF HUMAN CELLS AND THE OBSTACLES THAT MUST BE OVERCOME BEFORE
THESE POTENTIAL USES WILL BE REALIZED?, at http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics6.asp
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH VI].
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supply. 134  Stem cells, if directed to differentiate into specific cell
types, offer the possibility of a renewable source of replacement cells
and tissues to treat diseases including, but not limited to, Parkinson's
and Alzheimer's diseases, spinal cord injury, stroke, bums, heart
disease, diabetes, osteoarthritis, and rheumatoid arthritis.'
35
In 2001, research conducted in animal model systems suggested
that stem cells derived from bone marrow might be used to treat heart
disease. 136  These reports, along with successive studies that used
other tissue types as a source for human embryonic stem cells, have
created a great deal of excitement over the enormous potential of stem
cell therapy to treat human disease. There is also a powerful
commercial incentive to conduct this research, and in particular for
heart disease therapy, since it is the leading cause of death in the U.S.,
with over $300 billion dollars spent annually on treatment. 137
Stem cells are also themselves research tools used to investigate
basic biological processes, as well as therapeutic methods for treating
human disease; i.e., they can be used to test new drugs.' 38  For
example, new medications can be tested for safety on differentiated
cells generated from human pluripotent 139 cell lines. 140 Other kinds of
cell lines are already used in this way, such as cancer cell lines
employed to screen potential anti-tumor drugs.' 4' The University of
Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation hold U.S.
patents that include stem cell lines and genetic markers used to
identify stem cells. 142 However, only a limited number of embryonic
stem cell lines are publicly available, with the actual number of
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Donald Orlic et al., Bone Marrow Cells Regenerate Infarcted Myocardium, 410
NATURE 701 (2001); see also, Kenneth R. Chien, Lost in Translation, 428 NATURE 607 (2004);
Helen Pearson, The Heart of the Matter, 10 NATURE MEDICINE 445 (2004).
137. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION,
CHRONIC DISEASE OVERVIEW, at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/overview.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2005).
138. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH VI, supra note 133.
139. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELL INFORMATION: GLOSSARY, at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/glossary2.asp. (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) (defining pluripotent as
the ability of a single stem cell to develop into many different cell types of the body).
140. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH VI, supra note 133; see NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH, STEM CELL INFORMATION: GLOSSARY, supra note 139.
141. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH VI, supra note 133; see NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH, STEM CELL INFORMATION: GLOSSARY, supra note 139.
142. Gretchen Vogel, Stem Cell Claims Face Legal Hurdles, 305 SCIENCE 1887 (2004).
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existing lines the subject of much current debate. 143 In particular, the
federal NIH research funds now exclude the generation of new human
embryonic stem cell lines.144 At the same time, the suitability of
legacy cell lines is questionable, such that the generation of new lines
is an attractive target for firms seeking to create and profit from stem
cells as valuable research tools.
Like other medical research, the development of stem cell
therapeutics will doubtlessly require the use of patented research
tools. In particular, molecules that prevent allogenic 45 rejection or
that direct embryonic stem cells to develop into a desired cell type
will be necessary. For example, researchers induced embryonic stem
cells to differentiate into dopamine expressing midbrain neurons by
providing an exogenous source of the Nurrl gene. 146  These cells
have the potential to treat Parkinson's disease, and are the focus of
research at the Gaithersburg, Maryland firm NeuralStem.
47
Researchers have also developed screens to select among millions of
compounds that control the development of stem cell lines into a
particular desired cell type. 148 Compounds identified in such screens
are obvious candidates for research tools used to manipulate
embryonic stem cells.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUES
The Supreme Court is scheduled to decide within the next few
months whether the statutory research exemption will act as a defense
to patent infringement for pre-clinical research studies conducted
early in the drug development process. The main issue to be
addressed by the Court is whether such studies are "reasonably
related to the development and submission of information" to the
FDA. A direct implication of such a decision is whether commercial
drug manufacturers will be able to invoke the safe harbor provisions
143. See Gretchen Vogel, Bush Squeezes Between the Lines on Stem Cells, 293 SCIENCE
1242, 1242-45 (2001) (noting that the Bush Administration currently allows the National
Institutes of Health to fund work using human embryonic stem cells-but only work using cell
lines derived before the announcement of this decision on Aug. 9, 2001).
144. Id. at 1244.
145. Being genetically different although belonging to, or obtained from the same species.
See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS app. F, at http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scirereport/appendixF.asp (last
visited Apr. 4, 2005).
146. Jong-Hoon Kim et. al., Dopamine Neurons Derived From Embryonic Stem Cells
Function in an Animal Model of Parkinson's Disease, 418 NATURE 50,50-56 (2002).
147. See id.
148. Ding & Schultz, supra note 130, at 835.
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of § 271(e)(1) for "upstream" research similar to that conducted by
Merck in Integra. Such preliminary research encompasses various
kinds of biomedical work, including research conducted via
collaborative efforts with universities and not-for profit organizations.
University research has traditionally been protected from patent
infringement under the common law research exemption. The Madey
ruling, however, states that such research should refrain from
furthering the institution's legitimate business objectives, if it is to
invoke the protection of the common law research exemption. 49 As a
result, the combination of these two decisions may exclude early
stage research that furthers an institution's legitimate business from
any sort of research exemption altogether.
One example that is particularly relevant in California is human
embryonic stem cell research though the California Institute for
Regenerative Medicine ("CIRM"). Stem cell research is an area with
exciting potential in biomedical experimentation, much of which
takes place in university research labs and not-for profit
organizations.1 50  Proposition 71 contains an implicit expectation of
commercial gain from taxpayers' investment in stem cell research,
including the advancement of California's biotechnology industry. 5'
Stem cell research is also in its early stages; in fact, no such research
appears to be at the stage of FDA submissions. 152 Thus, a potential
149. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958
(2003).
150. According to the analysis of Proposition 71 by the Legislative Analyst, printed in the
ballot pamphlet for the General Election of Nov. 2, 2005, universities have long since been
dubbed "playgrounds" for innovation. Proposition 71 acknowledges that the University of
California is currently engaged in stem cell research. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 68 (Nov. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/english.pdf.
In addition, the measure intends to apply up to ten percent of the funds available for grants and
loans to develop scientific and medical research facilities for not-for profit entities within the
first five years of the implementation of the measure. Id. at 70. The Independent Citizens
Oversight Committee ("ICOC") is the governing board for the California Institute for
Regenerative Medicine, and represents California's leading public universities, including the
University of California, non-profit academic and research institutions, patient advocacy groups
as well as the biotechnology industry. See California Institute for Regenerative Medicine,
official website, at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/about (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
151. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 73
(Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/english.pdf.
152. For example, a recent search of the FDA clinical trials database identifies numerous
clinical trials using stem cells; most trials use autologous transplantation of stem cells from a
patient's own bone marrow, usually as an adjunct treatment for cancer. A single trial was found
for stem cells as a treatment for heart disease using autologous stem cell transplantation. No
trials were found using embryonic stem cells. See ClinicalTrials.gov, official website, at
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
2005]
880 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 21
problem for universities and not-for profit researchers involved with
CIRM is whether there is a research exemption available to them, or
if they will be held to costly licenses. The question that remains is
whether the remnants of the common law or statutory experimental
use exemptions will apply to any Proposition 71 -funded research. On
the other hand, the state of California seeks to profit from patents that
result from research performed through CIRM; therefore, the state, as
well as other investors, will ultimately be interested in the broadest
possible intellectual property rights.
The three most likely outcomes of the pending Supreme Court
review are: (1) leave the scope of the research exemption the same as
that interpreted by the Federal Circuit, (2) constrict the scope of the
research exemption, or (3) expand the scope to be broader than the
interpretation given by the Federal Circuit.
In developing the effects of these potential decisions, this
Comment considers the following questions: Would affirming or
narrowing the scope of the research exemption encumber academic
research scientists involved in basic research studies that are far
removed from the point of FDA regulatory submissions by requiring
them to license patented research tools that have until now been
accessible to them? Could this in turn have a chilling effect on drug
discovery and the development of potentially life-saving therapeutics?
Or, if the research exemption is broadened, would this undermine the
value of research tool patents, thereby diminishing incentives for
smaller companies to innovate such tools? Could this arguably be the
most damaging effect for California, seeing as the state seeks to
benefit from any patents that result from research funded by the new
taxpayer bonds?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Freedom to Operate and the Value of Research Tools in
Drug Discovery
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision will be widespread.
Biotechnology tool patents are often the main products of
biotechnology companies, thereby representing a considerable source
of their revenue. At the same time, progress in the pharmaceutical
industry and among basic researchers, depends heavily on the use of
patented research tools due to the critical roles they play in
biomedical labwork. The use of patented research tools is also
significant in terms of time, spanning up to 6.5 years in the preclinical
2005] RESEARCH EXEMPTION'S SAFE HARBOR 881
stage of drug development (see Fig. 1, below). It is important to note
that use of these tools shortens this period. Additional costs and
limited access to research tools would perhaps result in a longer time
to identify and validate a drug target.
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At the academic level, scientific work requires broad access to
research tools, many of which are patented. Access to a range of
tools, and the freedom to use them to test the functioning of patented
technologies, hypotheses, or to improve upon patented technologies is
at the heart of discovery and innovation in our society. Such
innovation is essential to our technology-driven economy and
advances in healthcare. Many scholars have argued that the increase
in patents on research tools in the biotechnological sector has resulted
in stacking royalty obligations that could have a chilling effect on
innovation and the development of new drugs at the academic
level.'53 Critics of the Federal Circuit's rulings in Madey and Integra
contend that the holdings could also unduly restrict university and
other not-for profit research. In his article, Renting Space on the
Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use
Doctrine, Tom Saunders asserts that the Federal Circuit's ruling in
Madey "undermines the balance between innovation and access that
lies at the heart of the Patent Act."'
15 4
In theory, this could be true. This Comment, however, argues
that in actuality it is unlikely. Considering a world devoid of this
freedom to operate, if a university scientist found that he needed five
patented tools to conduct a year's worth of research that had no
obvious prospect of commercial gain, he may need to theoretically
contract individually with each of the five patentees and pay upfront
for five separates licenses. Naturally, this would create a significant
bureaucratic burden on scientists-not to mention a significant
expense-especially if he is operating on federally funded grants, 20-
30% of which may be taken by the university itself for overhead
costs. 155 One can imagine the stifling effect such a scenario would
have on the totality of university researchers.
From a practical standpoint, however, a patentee has little
motivation to bring an infringement suit against a university or a not-
153. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 38, at 7 (describing assertions by scientists that "the
stacking of intellectual property obligations as successive tools are used in the course of an
extended research project has the potential to impede or even preclude the development of new
and better diagnostic and therapeutic products"); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology
Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 168
(1994) (stating that patents on research tools "can create obstacles to subsequent [research and
development] and add to a thicket of rights that firms must negotiate their way past before they
can get their products on the market").
154. Saunders, supra note 15, at 262.
155. David P. Hamilton, Indirect Costs: Round II, 254 SCIENCE 788, 788-89 (1991)
(noting that Congress "capped the portion of administrative expenses that can be assigned to
indirect costs at 26%").
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for profit institution. Damages are likely to be small, if any. And, the
incentive to obtain an injunction would be mitigated by potential
revenues on any invention commercialized under the patent, as well
as the high cost of initiating and maintaining an infringement suit.
Further, many large universities are sophisticated players in
biomedical research.156 Commentators assert that not only are large
universities actively involved in patent applications and licensing,
they are also diligent. about protecting their patent rights.
157
Moreover, there is little evidence to support the contention that
universities are threatened by the biotechnology industry through
patent infringement suits.' 8  Hence, some argue that it is research
productivity companies who are on the defense, 5 9 and caution against
disabling biotechnology firms from using legal strategies to capture a
fair share of the value that their discoveries contribute to subsequent
downstream innovation. 160 Indeed, this would dissuade companies
from sharing their innovations with the public, and arguably eliminate
a market for business models based on licensing schemes.
Still, some scholars have described examples of how reduced
access to patented research tools has played out in the academic
sector. University technology licensing directors have noted the
challenge of "[riestricted availability or delays in exchange of
'research tools' (such as vectors or transgenic mice) in biological
research,"'6'1 and researchers who use microarrays to screen patients
for genetic variations have voiced their concern that a license might
156. Huang, supra note 111, at 109 (contending that Madey and Integra were decided
correctly and that the concerns expressed by critics of the decisions are unfounded).
157. Id.
158. Id at 112 (demonstrating that "[tlhe only case in which a university was sued for
patent infringement was Madey in which the plaintiff was not an industrial entity, but rather a
disgruntled former faculty member").
159. Id.
160. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: ADVANCES IN GENETICS 113 (F. Scott Kieff
ed., 2003).
161. Mueller, supra note 38, at 8 (quoting Lita Nelsen, The Rise ofIntellectual Property
Protection in the American University, 279 SCIENCE 1460, 1461 (1998)); see also NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING
GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm (acknowledging that "[m]any scientists and
institutions involved in biomedical research are frustrated by growing difficulties and delays in
negotiating the terms of access to research tools"); Eliot Marshall, A Deluge of Patents Creates
Legal Hassles for Research, 288 SCIENCE 255, 257 (2000).
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be required for each of the thousands of DNA sequences hybridized
to a microchip.1
62
Further, in the area of patient care, some physicians have
reported a bottleneck that prevents them from obtaining and sharing
with patients information that could improve their health. Dr. Edwin
M. Stone and colleague Val C. Sheffield, both Howard Hughes
Medical Institute Investigators at the University of Iowa College of
Medicine in Iowa City, had been running genetic tests on their eye
patients for over a decade as part of a research program. 163 Because
some of the genes tested have subsequently been patented, they found
themselves in the position of notifying the patentees of the genes used
in their work.164 Dr. Stone now offers genetic tests for eye diseases as
a clinical service of the university rather than as a research project,
with the important caveat that no one-neither the university nor
those who own the genes through patents-can make any profit from
the tests.' 65 This is his solution to the possibility of being held liable
for infringement, and as of August 2003, among the seventy-two
patentees he notified (traced to twenty-six different patented genes),
twelve have responded and none has objected to his plan.1 66
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute,
Inc. 167 is the first reported lawsuit alleging that a gene patent hindered
research. 168  When the parents of various children with Canavan
disease 69 solicited the help of a researcher to develop a prenatal
genetic test using genetic material from the families, the researcher
proceeded to patent the test. 170  Thereafter, the patentee allegedly
began charging the families for testing as well as actively enforcing
162. Mueller, supra note 38, at 8 n.34 (citing Robert F. Service, Will Patent Fights Hold
DNA Chips Hostage?, 282 SCIENCE 396, 397 (1998)).
163. Ron Winslow, Researchers Have Plan for Genetic Eye Tests Ignored by Industry,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2003, at B 1.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
168. Gene Patenting Run Amok? Lawsuit Alleges Patent Hinders Research, BIORESEARCH
ONLINE, Nov. 21, 2000, at
http://www.bioresearchonline.com/content/news/article.asp?DoclD= {D729C4 05-BF95-1 1 D4-
8C7F-009027DE0829}&Bucket-&Featured=&VNETCOOKIE=NO.
The case involved Canavan disease. Children with Canavan disease suffer myelin sheath
destruction with the first symptoms appearing between three and six months of age.
169. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
170. Id. at 1066-67.
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his rights by limiting other research efforts. 17' The families brought
suit, claiming that the patentee used resources dedicated to the public
to obtain a patent, charge royalties, and limit testing availability.1
72
The district court granted the research institute's motion to dismiss-
in-part because extending a duty of informed consent to cover
economic interests as well as conversion rights would "chill medical
research" and "give rise to a type of dead-hand control that research
subjects could hold because they would be able to dictate how
medical research progresses."' 73  This case illustrates a dramatic
example of how asserting rights to patented tools can potentially
block research with important consequences for human health.
Yet, patent holders do not seek to block research. They seek
market realized solutions, such as business models based on licensing
proposals. In reality, there has never been a broad experimental use
exception in the U.S. Based on the legislative history, the federal
research exemption appears to have been specifically enacted to
enable generic competitors to bring competitively priced drug
analogs, devices and other food additives to the market. Most patent
attorneys understand this; hence, it is fairly clear that university and
not-for profit research activities that make use of unlicensed patents
infringe those patents. Due to the impracticability of bringing an
infringement suit and the minimal potential damages involved, the
cases noted are in many ways rare. Even still, the research landscape
requires legislative clarification regarding the scope and depth of the
statutory research exemption.
B. Implications of the Pending Supreme Court Decision in
Integra
1. Affirmation of the Federal Circuit's Decision
If the Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit's decision, the
ruling will strengthen the protection of patents.1 74 It will be seen as a
plus for research tool patentees, and likely induce more cross-
licensing and less frequent misappropriation of unlicensed patented
tools. Biotechnology companies could attempt to enforce their patent
rights against academics and not-for profit scientists who have been
171. Id. at 1067.
172. Id. at 1068.
173. Id. at 1070-71.
174. Huang, supra note 111, at 98.
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using patented research tools without licenses; however, as stated
above, this would be unlikely.
Many academic researchers are likely to continue business as
usual, maintaining that most or all research done in an academic
setting is basic, and not applied research. Some will argue that
applied medical research is related to the discovery of drug
candidates, and therefore falls within the provisions of the statutory
safe harbor. A broad look at the academic landscape, however,
suggests that this defense will not be available for many of the
academic users of patented research tools. 175 The majority of not-for
profit scientists are not conducting experiments to support FDA
submissions, which must be done under conditions in strict
compliance with good laboratory practice ("GLP") guidelines. In
addition, many are engaged in "cross-over" or translational research
that falls outside the scope of the Federal Circuit's reading of the
common law research exemption. Moreover, Merck's claim that its
research supported the provision of data for regulatory approval was
easily shot down; the Federal Circuit declared that at minimum, a
clinical drug candidate must have been identified at the time of
infringing activity for this exemption to apply.
176
2. Integra Read in Light of Madey
While academic research may be considered "purely
philosophical" in certain cases, it is unlikely to ever be seen as having
no bearing whatsoever on a given university's legitimate business of
attracting and retaining students. The Madey court set the bar quite
high in this regard by arguing that most academic research is a
financial plus for any university trying to attract students, as well as
federal funding. 177  Under this view, such research will rarely be
considered purely academic for learning's sake. Perhaps this will
cause scientists to attempt to "cloak" their work--commercial or
not-under the guise of "pure" academic research. As it stands, both
avenues of potential exemption from patent infringement appear to be
closed off for university and not-for profit researchers.
175. Mueller, supra note 38, at 18.
176. Michael S. Greenfield & Kevin E. Noonan, Biotechnology Tool Patent Owners
Breathe Sigh of Relief The Association of Patent Law Firms, at
http://www.aplf.org/news/integra.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
177. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 958 (2003).
2005]
888 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 21
Pushing university scientists further away from any form of
research exemption under the common law doctrine, as interpreted in
Madey, is a strong trend at academic institutions toward industrial
collaborations. 78  There is a current move from basic research into
translational research, in which universities take equity in companies
as part of a diversified technology transfer licensing agreements.
179
Technology transfer is the formal transferring of new discoveries and
innovation resulting from scientific research conducted at universities
to the commercial sector. 180 This transfer often involves the patenting
and licensing of new inventions. The gross licensing received plus
royalties on product sales for universities is in the billions of
dollars. 81 Much of this cross-over is said to have been prompted by
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allowed universities to retain title
to inventions made with the use of federal funds, thereby enhancing
the incentives for such collaborations. 182 In turn, there has also been a
dramatic increase in biotechnology patenting in the last thirteen years;
a graphical representation of the total number of U.S. biotechnology
patents granted per year shows a rise from less than 2,000 patents
issuing in 1985 to more than 7,000 patents issuing in 1998 (see Fig. 2,
below).1 83  Currently, no federal law addresses whether this sort of
cross-over research should fall inside or outside a safe harbor. One
178. Shreefal Mehta, The Emerging Role ofAcademia in Commercializing Innovation, 22
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 21 (2004); see also Huang, supra note 111, at 116 ("[T]he
distinction between academic and commercial entities, at least in [sic] respect to biomedical
research, is fading.").
179. Mehta, supra note 178, at 21.
180. Act of Dec. 12 1980 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (Dec. 12,
1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
181. See Huang, supra note 111, at 108-09 (providing a detailed look at research
universities actively engaged in licensing and collecting royalties from their patents).
182. See Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1018 ("[U]niversities have become players in the
patent system in a way that could hardly have been imagined before the Bayh-Dole Act.
Universities owned 1.1% of U.S. corporate-owned patents issued between 1969 and 1989; by
1999 that number had risen to 4.8%." (citing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Colleges
and Universities-Utility Patent Grants, Calendar Years 1969-2000, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ-toc.htm (last visited May 4,
2005))); see also Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar.
2000, at 47 ("The clustering of computer-engineering and biotech firms around academic-
research centers in Silicon Valley; Austin, Texas; Route 128 in Massachusetts; and the Research
Triangle, in North Carolina, derives in large measure from the synergy between universities and
industry that Bayh-Dole has fostered.").
183. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology Industry Facts (2003), available
at http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). See also Fig.
2, below, for a U.S. Patent and Trademark Office report capturing the volume of
biotechnological patent examining activity by the U.S. Patent Examining Technology Center
Groups 1630-60 (formerly Patent Examining Group 1800) between 1989 and 2002.
2005] RESEARCH EXEMPTION'S SAFE HARBOR 889
can only presume that it does not; however, newly enacted legislation
should clarify if, and at what point researchers would be required to
take licenses.
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a. Proposition 71
Consider, for example, how an affirmation of the Federal
Circuit's holding would play out in California with respect to the new
stem cell legislation. Much of the research funded by Proposition 71
will include collaborations between universities and industry. 84  In
Madey, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the common law research
exemption would not apply "so long as the [research] is in furtherance
of the alleged infringer's legitimate business."' 185  The commercial
purpose of Proposition 71 in California is brought to light by the
economic implications of the legislation: the state seeks to share in
royalties from patents and licenses for products developed in the
program. 186 Further, to the extent that the University of California
receives a share of the grants awarded by the CIRM, it could attract
additional federal or private research funding for this same purpose-187
The University of California system could also eventually receive
significant revenues from patents, royalties, and licenses. 188  Thus, it
is reasonable to expect that the holding in Madey will extend to
Proposition 71 collaborations that include university researchers that
currently operate under a research exemption.
In addition, embryonic stem cell research is still at a formative
stage, i.e., it is relatively far from the point of FDA approval.
Accordingly, it falls outside the Federal Circuit's reading of the
statutory safe harbor. On one hand, an affirmation of the Federal
Circuit's decision could stifle university research by requiring
184. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 147
§ 3 (Nov. 2, 20040, available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/english.pdf ("It is the intent of
the people of California in enacting this measure to: Authorize an average of $295 million per
year in bonds over a 10-year period to fund stem cell research and dedicated facilities for
scientists at California's universities and other advanced medical research facilities throughout
the state.").
185. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
958 (2003).
186. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 147-
49 § 5 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/english.pdf
The ICOC shall establish standards that require that all grants and loan awards be
subject to intellectual property agreements that balance the opportunity of the
State of California to benefit from the patents, royalties, and licenses that result
from basic research, therapy development, and clinical trials with the need to
assure that essential medical research is not unreasonably hindered by the
intellectual property agreements.
Id. (referring to section 125290.3(h), to be added to California's Health and Safety Code).
187. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 68
(Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/english.pdf.
188. See id.
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universities and not-for profit entities to take costly licenses. At the
same time, the value of research tool patents will be expanded by
such a decision; and paradoxically, research tools include compounds,
methods and primary stem cell lines used to develop such
therapeutics. Thus, an affirmative ruling would cut both ways among
stem cell researchers in California. The state, seeking to patent
innovations that result from research funded by the grant monies
would surely be interested in the broadest possible exclusionary
rights. And, because it is generally unlikely that patentees will bring
suit against universities, affirmation of the ruling is probably the best
route for the Supreme Court. This would keep the value of tool
patents high, and allow the legislature to refine the parameters of the
research exemption, or craft a new exemption altogether.
3. Narrowing the Scope of the Research Exemption
In Integra, the Federal Circuit confirmed that with respect to
biomedical research and drug manufacturing, the statutory research
exemption applies only to activities that would contribute (relatively
directly) to information the FDA considers in approving a drug. 189 It
is unlikely that the Supreme Court would narrow the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of the research exemption as this would further
constrict the federal safe harbor. Genentech has argued that "limiting
the scope of the FDA exemption to activities in connection with the
abbreviated or generic drug approval process would have a
disproportionately harsh impact on the biologics sector of the
pharmaceutical industry." 190 This is because "the developer of a new
biologic must employ a diverse and broad range of investigative
technologies in conducting such research, some or all of which may
be subject to patents."'191 Further, the American Intellectual Property
Law Association (AIPLA) has argued that limiting the safe harbor
protection to clinical trials that are reasonably related only to the
exact drug for which FDA approval is sought would leave the statute
too narrow because "[1]imitation of the safe harbor to 'clinical'
189. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237).
190. Brief of Amici Curiae Genentech and Biogen Idec, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 18,
Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
191. Id.
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experiments would ignore the extensive preclinical data required by
the FDA."
'1 92
In California, a narrowing of the research exemption by the
Supreme Court would play out in much the same way as affirming; a
further limitation of the exemption would surely reach into the
domain of basic medical research carried out by universities and not-
for profit organizations. With respect to research funded under
Proposition 71, narrowing the safe harbor protection to clinical trials
that are reasonably related to only the exact drug for which FDA
approval is sought could be impracticable for stem cell research, due
to the fact it is still in its early stages.' 93 In addition, the clearly
identifiable commercial goals of the legislation would brand state
funded stem cell research as applied research, making the common
law experimental use exemption unavailable. This situation would
arguably be a strong deterrent for academic researchers interested in
exploring new methods and uses for embryonic stem cells. This
effect runs counter to the expectations set by proponents of
Proposition 71, namely by creating a possible stifling effect on
progress in human embryonic stem cell research. But, affirming or
narrowing the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the scope of the safe
harbor would strengthen the value of research tool patents-a result
that would reinforce any intellectual property rights the state acquires,
thereby improving their position as patent holders in the long run.
4. Expanding the Scope of the Research Exemption
If the Supreme Court expands the scope of the research
exemption to be broader than the interpretation given by the Federal
Circuit, a consequence would be a decrease in the perceived value of
research tool patents. In its brief before the Court, Merck argues that
the FDA exemption covering any uses "reasonably related to the
development and submission of information" to the FDA should be
interpreted broadly.' 94 Merck states that any research that is "directed
at developing information relevant to an IND ['investigational new
drug'] application" should fall under the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor. 195
The pharmaceutical company claims that the allegedly infringing
192. Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Neither Party at 9, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No.
03-1237).
193. See supra text accompanying note 152.
194. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823
(No. 03-1237).
195. Id.
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experiments in its case fall within the safe harbor statute because (i) it
was reasonably believed that the compound was a viable drug
candidate, and (ii) the experiments produced information that is
considered in an IND application.'
96
It is interesting to note that in 1984, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA) took the opposite point of view as
amicus curiae in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical,
Co. 197  There, the group of 135 companies argued that because
pharmaceutical innovation is a very costly and lengthy process,
allowing generic drug manufacturers to make unlicensed use of
pioneer drugs for testing in view of FDA approval would reduce
incentives for the future innovation of new pharmaceutical
products. 198 The PMA urged the Federal Circuit to hold that any use
of a patented drug for testing or other purposes to satisfy regulatory
requirements should be considered an illegal infringement. 199 Now,
Merck, having found itself on the opposite side of bench, urges the
Court to find otherwise. Clearly, a broader interpretation of the
research exemption is most favorable to any party wishing to use
patented research tools without a license.
The U.S. government, which filed a brief in support of Merck's
petition for certiorari, as well as one on the merits of the case, is
playing a significant role in arguing for a broadening of the research
exemption. Specifically, the government claims that the statutory
research exemption should protect "all activities that are undertaken
in the course of attempting to develop a particular drug and are
reasonably related to the development of the types of information that
would be relevant to an investigational new drug application or new
drug application., 200  Further, it asserts that the exemption should
apply to pre-clinical studies, and that it should begin to apply once
research progresses "beyond basic research and is engaged in focused
efforts to develop a particular drug.
201
In their amicus brief before the Court, Eli Lilly & Co., Wyeth,
and Pfizer, Inc. argue that an affirmation of the Federal Circuit's
ruling would be seen as a tightening of the bottleneck for commercial
196. Id. at 27.
197. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Roche
Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm., Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (No. 84-560).
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id. at3.
200. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Supporting Petitioner at 8, Merck KGaA v.
Integra LifeSciences 1, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
201. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
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research.2°2 Analogizing innovative new drug development to a
funneling process,
[t]he [Federal Circuit's] decision enables patent holders to prevent
others from entering, or moving down the funnel. As a result, drug
development will slow and its costs will mount in what is already a
lengthy, high risk, high cost process; patients will be deprived of
timely access to new, safer, more effective drugs; the entry of
generic equivalents will be delayed; promising drugs to treat
unmet medical needs will never be developed; and drug
development activities along with valuable American jobs will be
exported to countries having more favorable legal environments.
203
Eli Lilly and associated amici curiae state that for
pharmaceutical companies, almost every experiment is reasonably
related to FDA approval. 204 Due to the length of time, risks and high
costs involved in drug research, every action in the process must be
carefully planned and directed toward obtaining FDA approval.2 °5
Further, they argue that whether an activity is reasonably related
under § 271(e)(1) must be determined on a case by case basis, based
on an examination of the facts surrounding each use of a patented
invention. °6
These arguments are in direct conflict with the interests of
smaller companies with ownership in patent portfolios they seek to
license to the public. Despite the widespread use of patented tools in
many areas of the drug discovery process, and over long periods of
time, a potential expansion of the research exemption would most
certainly bring their value into question. In many cases, "but for" the
use of patented tools, research may not have continued to the point of
identification of a valuable drug candidate. And, even if their use did
not lead to the creation of a blockbuster drug, such use may have
allowed researchers to rule out poor candidates, thereby saving time
and money early in the discovery process. A broad interpretation of
the research exemption would therefore vitiate any value that is
currently attributed to research tool patents.20 7
202. Brief of Anici Curiae Eli Lilly & Co., Wyeth, and Pfizer, Inc. in Support of
Petitioner, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
203. Id. at 4.
204. See id. at 1.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Id. at 15.
207. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237) ("[E]xpansion of §
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In their brief before the Court as amici curiae in support of
respondent, Invitrogen Corporation, Affymetrix, Inc., Symyx
Technologies, Inc. and other high-tech companies argue that,
[i]f patents on such tools can be readily infringed in the course of
developing information for submission to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the economic value of the patents will be
essentially lost and the incentives crucial to support creation of
new and better tools in the future will be slowed, if not completely
eliminated, along with the related discoveries, efficiencies, and
cost-savings.
208
Therefore, a broad reading of § 271(e)(1) to include research
tools would also arguably hinder drug research and development. As
a consequence of a decrease in the perceived value of tool patents,
companies that need licenses on patented research tools may be
emboldened to negotiate for lower prices. 209 Furthermore, without
the ability of patentees to assert the value of a blockbuster drug in
subsequent litigation, they may be forced to accept lower prices in
licensing negotiations.2t °
Invitrogen and associated amici curiae also contend that the
absence of litigation in which § 271(e)(1) has been successfully
invoked to defend against infringement claims of research tool patents
is consistent with the longstanding understanding among members of
the patent and scientific communities, including pharmaceutical
companies, that the statute does not authorize the infringing use of
patented research tools.
211
Pharmaceutical companies seem to want the ability to use
patented research tools without licensing them for the development of
their own new chemical entities, as well as the benefits of the patent
system once a new pharmaceutical is ready to market. But just as
pharmaceutical manufacturers are rewarded with patent exclusivity
for the discovery of new chemical entities, so should every link in the
innovation chain be rewarded with exclusivity, whether it involves
271 (e)(l) to include the Scripps Merck activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of
patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.").
208. Brief of Amici Curiae Invitrogen Corp. et al. at 3-4, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
209. Stephen B. Maebius & Richard J. Warburg, Federal Circuit Reins in Free Use of
Patented Research Tools, 26 LEGAL TIMES 9 (2003) (noting the results of remanding and
vacating the $15 million damage award by the Federal Circuit in Integra).
210. Id.
211. Brief of Amici Curiae Invitrogen Corp. et al. at 7, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences 1, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (No. 03-1237).
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the discovery of research tools, devices or new chemical entities-all
of which play significant roles in the drug discovery process.
For stem cell research, an expansive reading of the research
exemption could mean a paradoxical opportunity for stem cell
researchers to enjoy the best of both worlds. Academics collaborating
with the biotechnology industry might be free to carry out much of
the more "basic" research in an academic setting, under the
experimental use exemption. At the same time, biotechnology firms
and the state of California could share the potential royalties from
intellectual property developed under such collaborations. For
patients, this situation provides a climate most suitable for more rapid
discovery of stem cell therapeutics. But, for existing patent holders,
as well as the state of California, an expanded exemption carries a
reduction in the value of biotechnology intellectual property. Such a
paradoxical situation is best addressed by the legislature.
C. Legislating a New Research Exemption
The potential problem of gaining access to patented research
tools due to expense and availability, combined with the need to
encourage and reward innovation, indicates the need on the part of
Congress to specify the scope of the experimental use exemption as it
stands after the Integra court ruling, and in light of Madey v. Duke
University. The problem lies in creating a new version of the research
exemption that rewards the patentee, while simultaneously
maintaining access to patented tools, thereby reducing liability in the
academic sector. Several plans have emerged that suggest specific
instructions for legislating an updated version of the research
exemption.1 2
A newly tailored research exemption should minimize the
burden on basic scientists. If scientists are required to jump through
numerous hoops, such as complicated and expensive licensing
contracts, simply to conduct basic research, they will be less inclined
to do so. Another possible implication of burdensome licensing
212. Numerous legal scholars have proposed models for a revised experimental use
defense. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARiz. L. REV. 457 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1017 (1989); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA
Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory
Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1637 (2001); Mueller, supra
note 38, at 17; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000).
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requirements might be an infringer's attempt to circumvent U.S.
patents by moving research offshore.213 Further, some university
researchers argue that biological inventions can simultaneously have
commercial applications as well as important roles in basic research.
The current research exemption seems to require classifying them as
one or the other.
Recently, Professor Mueller has suggested that Congress amend
the U.S. Patent Act by enacting "a narrowly defined, carefully
balanced experimental use provision that preserves incentives for
innovation while permitting unlicensed use of patented inventions in
certain instances of legitimate scientific research. 214  She
recommends that lawmakers consider at least several important
factors when implementing legislation, including: (1) the availability
of consensual licenses; (2) whether the challenged use amounts to
experimenting on a claimed invention or experimenting with it; (3)
the degree to which the alleged experimental activity is necessarily
incident to subsequent commercial exploitation; and (4) the balance
of harms invoked in the granting or denial of an experimental use
defense under the particular facts at hand.2 15 Taken together, these
factors will be key in assisting legislators in crafting a balanced
solution that protects the value of the patent system, thereby
rewarding innovation, while still granting exemptions in certain
circumstances. Indeed, calling for legislative action to define the
scope of the patent right is warranted. This is more appropriately a
task for the legislative branch than the executive or judicial branches
of the government.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the § 271(e)(1) safe
harbor in Integra, which confirms that it is reserved solely for clinical
regulatory data gathering, as well as its reading of the common law
experimental use exemption in Madey, suggests that neither of these
defenses are likely to be available to the great majority of university
scientists who use (or would like to use) patented research tools. This
is because many academic scientists have ties to commercial
213. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also
Mueller supra note 17, at 920 (stating that without an experimental use exemption, "scientific
research functions that require the use of patented inventions are more likely to be shifted
offshore to legally hospitable forums").
214. Mueller, supra note 17, at 980.
215. Id. at 973.
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endeavors. And, even if they do not, their work is unlikely to be
defined as "purely philosophical" under the Madey Court's reading of
the exemption, since all research-in one way or another-
contributes to the furtherance of a university's legitimate business (of
attracting and retaining students). While there may be little incentive
to enforce patent rights against universities, the language of the
statute, "solely for uses reasonably related to," requires clarification.
If the Supreme Court's decision narrows or affirms the Federal
Circuit's ruling, it will have a profound effect on Proposition 71 and
stem cell research in California. Stem cell research is not at the stage
of FDA regulatory submissions, and it is decidedly commercial in
purpose. For academic scientists in this field, the unfettered use of
patented research tools, long available under the common law and
statutory research exemptions, may now be subject to the same
restrictions applied to commercial researchers. At the same time, an
expansive reading of the federal research exemption could exaggerate
§ 271 (e)(1) beyond the purpose for which it was enacted, resulting in
an unwanted reduction in the value of research tool patents, many of
which are held by the University of California. Patent protection will
be critical in encouraging investment in the next generation of
research tools, which are likely to reduce the cost and time spent in
the clinical trial phase. To promote the incentives of the Patent Act,
the Supreme Court should affirm the Federal Circuit's decision, and
permit the legislature to enact new laws that specify what sort of
unlicensed use of patented research tools among universities and not-
for profit institutions is protected by the safe harbor, and when
licenses should be taken.
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